But the advocates of high protection in the House were not satisfied; they opposed the recommendations of the report and urged that the best and quickest way to reduce taxation was by abolishing or reducing items on the internal revenue list.This policy not only commanded support on the Republican side, but also received the aid of a Democratic faction which avowed protectionist principles and claimed party sanction for them.
These political elements in the House were strong enough to prevent action on the customs tariff, but a bill was passed reducing some of the internal revenue taxes.This action seemed likely to prevent tariff revision at least during that session.
Formidable obstacles, both constitutional and parliamentary, stood in the way of action, but they were surmounted by ingenious management.
The Constitution provides that all revenue bills shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate has the right to propose amendments.Under cover of this clause the Senate originated a voluminous tariff bill and tacked it to the House bill as an amendment.When the bill, as thus amended, came back to the House, a two-thirds vote would have been required by the existing rules to take it up for consideration, but this obstacle was overcome by adopting a new rule by which a bare majority of the House could forthwith take up a bill amended by the Senate, for the purpose of non-concurrence but not for concurrence.The object of this maneuver was to get the bill into a committee of conference where the details could be arranged by private negotiation.The rule was adopted on February 26, 1883, but the committee of conference was not finally constituted until the 1st of March, within two days of the close of the session.On the 3rd of March, when this committee reported a measure on which they had agreed, both Houses adopted this report and enacted the measure without further ado.
In some cases, rates were fixed by the committee above the figures voted in either House and even when there was no disagreement, changes were made.The tariff commission had recommended, for example, a duty of fifty cents a ton on iron ore, and both the Senate and the House voted to put the duty at that figure; but the conference committee fixed the rate at seventy-five cents.When a conference committee report comes before the House, it is adopted or rejected in toto, as it is not divisible or amendable.In theory, the revision of a report is feasible by sending it back to conference under instructions voted by the House, but such a procedure is not really available in the closing hours of a session, and the only practical course of action is either to pass the bill as shaped by the conferees or else to accept the responsibility for inaction.Thus pressed for time, Congress passed a bill containing features obnoxious to a majority in both Houses and offensive to public opinion.
Senator Sherman in his "Recollections" expressed regret that he had voted for the bill and declared that, had the recommendations of the tariff commission been adopted, "the tariff would have been settled for many years," but "many persons wishing to advance their particular industries appeared before the committee and succeeded in having their views adopted." In his annual message, December 4, 1883, President Arthur accepted the act as a response to the demand for a reduction of taxation, which was sufficiently tolerable to make further effort inexpedient until its effects could be definitely ascertained; but he remarked that he had "no doubt that still further reductions may be wisely made."In general, President Arthur's administration may therefore be accurately described as a period of political groping and party fluctuation.In neither of the great national parties was there a sincere and definite attitude on the new issues which were clamorous for attention, and the public discontent was reflected in abrupt changes of political support.There was a general feeling of distrust regarding the character and capacity of the politicians at Washington, and election results were apparently dictated more by fear than by hope.One party would be raised up and the other party cast down, not because the one was trusted more than the other, but because it was for a while less odious.
Thus a party success might well be a prelude to a party disaster because neither party knew how to improve its political opportunity.The record of party fluctuation in Congress during this period is almost unparalleled in sharpness.** In 1875, at the opening of the Forty-fourth Congress, the House stood 110 Republicans and 182 Democrats.In 1881, the House stood 150 Republicans to 131 Democrats, with 12 Independent members.In 1884, the Republican list had declined to 119 and the Democratic had grown to 201, and there were five Independents.The Senate, although only a third of its membership is renewed every two years, displayed extraordinary changes during this period.The Republican membership of 46 in 1876 had declined to 33 by 1880, and the Democratic membership had increased to 42.In 1882, the Senate was evenly balanced in party strength, each party having 37 avowed adherents, but there were two Independents.
In state politics, the polling showed that both parties were disgusted with their leadership and that there was a public indifference to issues which kept people away from the polls.Acomparison of the total vote cast in state elections in 1882 with that cast in the presidential election of 1880, showed a decline of over eight hundred thousand in the Republican vote and of nearly four hundred thousand in the Democratic vote.The most violent of the party changes that took place during this period occurred in the election of 1882, in New York State, when the Republican vote showed a decline of over two hundred thousand and the Democratic candidate for Governor was elected by a plurality of nearly that amount.It was this election which brought Grover Cleveland into national prominence.
